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1. Introduction 
The need for and extent of redistribution processes is 
one of the most discussed issues which has not only an 
economic and social dimension, but also a political one 
(Mikušová Meričková and Halásková, 2014a, 2014b). 
The extent of redistribution should be a compromise 
between equity versus efficiency (a trade-off 
compromise according to the theory of welfare 
economics) (Bailey, 1995; Cullis and Jones, 1992). 
Finding an optimal level of redistribution is a complex 
issue as it is a welfare-state concept, and therefore 
needs to be defined by each economy with respect to 
national customs, traditions and specificities. The 
welfare state is based on the idea that a country has a 
certain range of redistribution processes, defined by the 
amount of public expenditure on social protection, in 
order to set equal opportunities at the beginning of 
one’s life and to use social policy to create an 
environment of adequate welfare (Adnet and Hardy, 
2005; Diamond and Lodge, 2013; Farnsworth and 
Irving, 2011; León, 2012; Ochrana and Nekola, 2009; 
Pestieau, 2006; Sinn, 1995). 
In connection with the practical perspective of this 
issue, there has been a focus on redistribution processes 
and the amount of public social expenditure (Adema et 
al., 2011; Goudswaard and Caminada, 2010; Immervoll 
and Richardson, 2011; Pestieau, 2006; Wang et al., 
2012), redistribution with respect to income inequality 
(Immervoll and Richardson, 2011; Korpi and Palme 
1998; Niehues, 2010) and income redistribution in 
relation to social and economic development (Alesina 
and Rodrik, 1994; Cingano, 2014; Mikušová 
Meričková and Halásková, 2014a, 2014b; Perotti, 
1996; Pisu, 2012).  
As a follow-up study of existing research Mikušová 
Meričková and Halásková (2014a, 2014b), this study 
aims to evaluate, based on a theoretical and empirical 
approach, the level of redistribution processes given the 
amount of expenditure on social protection, in 
connection with income inequality and socio-economic 
development in selected European countries. What is 
defined in line with the aim is the object of research: 
the correlation between social and economic policy 
from a narrow perspective.  
The first part of the study deals with welfare-state 
regimes in relation to redistribution. In the empirical 
part, the object of statistical testing is the research 
question about the existence of a relation between the 
amount of selected social protection expenditure 
according to function (expenditure on the 
sickness/health-care, on the disabled and on the old 
age) on the one hand, and the achieved level of socio-
economic development and quantified Human 
Development Index (HDI) and the level of distribution 
of available incomes, evaluated using Gini coefficient, 
on the other hand. Expenditures on social protection by 
selected functions have been chosen with a particular 
focus placed on material living standards and health, 
which are features defining the quality of life from the 
viewpoint of human resources.  
2. Welfare state concept  
Attempts to reduce income and social inequalities have 
a history in Europe. In each country, the development 
of redistribution was different. In the course of the 20th 
century, models of social protection, varying in their 
range of redistribution processes, developed in Europe 
(Adnet and Hardy, 2005). Esping-Andersen’s 
categories draw on Weber’s methodological approach 
in constructing holistic ideal-types. These are reflected 
upon in the profile of public expenditure and welfare 
outcomes across social protection regimes (Adnet and 
Hardy 2005; Brennan et al., 2012; Diamond and Lodge, 
2013; Farnsworth and Irving, 2011; Pestieau, 2006; 
Sinn, 1995). Nordic (social democratic) welfare states 
are predicated on social investment strategies that 
promote higher employment and growth, ensuring a 
cradle-to-grave provision of child care and social care 
for the elderly. Income redistribution reaches a high 
level, which corresponds with high public expenditure 
in social areas. Implementation of this model can be 
found mainly in Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway 
and, partially, in the Netherlands. Continental 
(conservative) welfare states maintain contributory 
social insurance systems that offer high levels of 
protection to insiders, while continuing to regulate 
employment and the labour market. Redistribution 
processes are based on an insurance principle, when the 
source of public expenditure in the social area is public 
insurance. This model is implemented in, for instance, 
France, Germany, Austria and, at this juncture, also in 
Switzerland. Anglo-Saxon (liberal) welfare states have 
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undergone a transition, adopting elements of the social 
investment approach. Nonetheless, welfare-benefit 
levels remain relatively low, there is a significant 
reliance on targeting and means-testing, and a 
considerable proportion of state services have been 
privatised. The range of redistribution processes and 
public expenditure on social areas is lower, compared 
with other models. Within Europe, this social model is 
implemented mainly in Great Britain and Ireland. 
3. Material and methodology 
The study uses the analytic classification comparison 
and abstraction in selected theoretical approaches to 
develop a theoretical-methodological framework for 
the research solution–concerning the relation between 
redistribution and socio-economic development, 
income inequality. This relation is statically tested; the 
study uses a quantitative approach to the research 
question. The outcomes of comparative analysis are 
concluded by methods of synthesis and partial 
induction. The research has a secondary character, uses 
the Eurostat statistics data (due to data availability for 
the 2005–2012 period). The data was gained by the 
constructive method, and processed by statistical 
methods described below.  
According to the European System of Integrated 
Social Protection Statistics ESSPROS (2012), 
expenditure on social protection is divided into four 
categories. The first one is expenditures on social 
benefits, which are resources in the form of cash, 
products or services. The second category relates to 
administrative expenses, connected with the system of 
providing social protection. The third and fourth 
categories deal with transfers into other systems and 
various expenditures. According ESSPROS (2012) 
social protection is defined as encompassing all 
interventions from public or private bodies intended to 
relieve households and individuals of the burden of a 
defined set of risks or needs, defined through eight 
functions of social protection: sickness/health care, 
disability, old age, survivors, family/children, 
unemployment, housing, and social exclusion not 
classified elsewhere. 
This paper focuses on key areas of social policy, and 
in connection to redistribution processes, three 
categories of expenditure are observed. These are 
categories of expenditure on social protection by 
function (social protection expenditure on 
sickness/health care, disability, old age) have been 
selected on the basis of these functions with regard to 
the selected group, in which at least a minimal extent of 
social protection in these areas (for citizens with the 
lowest income) is supposed also in countries with a 
liberal approach to social policy. 
What is being statistically tested is the research 
issue of the existence of the relation between the 
amount of selected social protection expenditure by 
function (expenditure on the sickness/health-care, on 
the disabled and on old age) on the one hand, and the 
achieved level of socio-economic development and 
quantified Human Development Index (HDI) and the 
level of division of available incomes, calculated using 
Gini coefficient, on the other hand. 
The object of the quantitative analysis is a set of 
seventeen European countries comprising: Belgium-
BE, Czech Republic-CZ, Denmark-DK, Estonia-EE, 
Greece-EL, France-FR, Italy-IT, Latvia-LV, 
Luxembourg-LU, Hungary-HU, Netherlands-NL, 
Poland-PL, Romania-RO, Slovakia-SK, Sweden-SE, 
United Kingdom-UK, Switzerland-CH. The sample 
was deliberately selected in order to ensure its 
heterogeneity from the viewpoint of observed 
indicators/variables influencing the statistical testing. 
These countries vary in their level of redistribution 
policy (according to the welfare state and a different 
level of expenditure on social protection) and their level 
of socio-economic development. 
Testing of the relation between social protection 
expenditure by function on the one hand and socio-
economic development and income inequality on the 
other, was carried out using the method of the Pearson 
correlation coefficient. From the perspective of a 
standardised method of statistical testing of the 
dependence of variables (e.g. Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficient, where no linearity of the 
expected relationship or the common distribution of 
two variables can be supposed, Kendall’s coefficient of 
concordance, based on data related to metric or 
ordinary evaluation of n objects (i = 1, 2, …, n) 
according to two criteria X and Y) (Levin et al., 2013; 
Lynch, 2013) and the character of available data, the 
method using the Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
appears the most appropriate. 
This method is used to measure the strength of 
linear correlation between two random variables. 
Values range within the interval <–1, 1>, when the 
positive or negative value indicates the direction of 
correlation (positive in the case of correlation, negative 
in the case of anticorrelation) and its absolute value, the 
strength of correlation. The more the absolute value 
approaches 1 (or –1 for that matter), the stronger the 
correlation is. One of the most frequently used 
calculations of correlation analysis appropriate for a 
given type of data is the Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient. The estimate of a pair correlation 
coefficient is defined as the estimate of covariance x 
and y divided by the multiplication of estimates of their 
standard deviations, i.e.  
    (1) 
cov
,xx
yx
x y
r
s s

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where covxy is the covariance between x and y and can 
be calculated as the average of the multiplication of 
deviations, i.e. it is a common measure of variability 
(covariance) for two features (x and y). The equation is 
based upon covariance, which is the level of mixed 
variability of variables x and y. 
   (2) 
To express the strength of the correlation, the 
coefficient of determination (r2) was used, which is the 
squared value of the coefficient of correlation (r), 
expressed in per cent. The coefficient of determination 
also states the extent of suitability of a model. It shows 
the part of y variability which can be explained by the 
model (Lynch, 2013).  
The calculations in the following part are the output 
of the SPSS Statistics 21.0 software. 
4. Results and discussion 
Based on an analysis carried out in the period 2005–
2012: 1) the results of the income redistribution that 
was reached and of the socio-economic development 
and income inequality in selected European countries 
are presented; 2) using the Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient and the coefficient of determination, the 
results of the range of expenditure on social protection 
with respect to socio-economic development, 
quantified with the Human Development Index, and 
with respect to income inequality, expressed by the 
Gini coefficient, are presented. 
4.1 Level of income redistribution in the selected 
European countries 
What is first assessed is the level of income 
redistribution according to social protection 
expenditure, by three functions (sickness/health care, 
disability, old age). The level of income redistribution 
in selected European countries in the years 2005–2012 
is provided in the following tables with the individual 
categories of social protection expenditure. More 
closely, key areas of social policy are targeted. What is 
observed in connection with redistribution processes 
are three categories of social protection expenditure 
spending by function (social protection expenditure on 
sickness/health care, disability, and old age). These 
have been selected based on these functions with regard 
to the selected group, where at least a minimal extent of 
social protection in these areas (for citizens with the 
lowest income) is supposed also in countries with a 
liberal approach to social policy. 
In a number of countries, health care is directly 
linked to social insurance through applied insurance 
schemes, which ensure both payment of health-care 
expenses and payment of sick leave. According to 
Gavurová and Šoltés (2014) and Pestieau (2006), a 
general phenomenon of health insurance in all 
advanced countries is the fact that public expenditure 
on health care grows faster than the economy. If public 
expenditure on health care grows faster than GDP, 
expenditure on social security, expenditure of the 
insured and expenditure of the payers of health 
insurance grows as well. 
Social protection expenditure by the 
sickness/health-care function covers, according to 
ESSPROS (2012): cash benefits that replace 
completely or partially the loss of earnings during 
temporary inability to work due to sickness or injury, 
and medical care provided in the framework of social 
protection to maintain, restore or improve the health of 
the people protected. The scope of cash benefits in this 
function is rather limited. Cash benefits that replace 
loss of earnings during temporary inability to work in 
the case of pregnancy or disability are recorded under 
the family/children or disability functions. Benefits 
provided by employers in the form of continued 
payment of wages and salaries during sickness are 
taken into account.  
In the set of selected countries, the highest social 
protection expenditures on sickness/health-care 
function as % of GDP were observed in the 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, France, Belgium (Table 
1). In years 2005–2012, a growing tendency to spend 
on social protection by sickness/health-care function 
can be observed, mainly in the Netherlands (increase of 
3.3% of GDP) and Belgium (by 1.1% of GDP), i.e. in 
countries with an obligatory health insurance scheme 
for citizens, and in Great Britain (increase of 1.5% of 
GDP), where the system of NHS is used–health care is 
paid by the state from taxes, without insurance funds. 
Among the countries with a relatively high rate of 
expenditure on social protection–sickness/health care–
in years 2005–2012 was France, whose health-care type 
of financing and outpatient care derives from the 
insurance system, but also here the system of a national 
health service is implemented. By contrast, the most 
significant decline in expenditure on social protection 
by sickness/health-care function over the evaluated 
period was observed in Hungary (decrease by 1.4% of 
GDP), and a slight decrease in spending (by 0.3–0.4% 
of GDP) took place in Latvia, Greece and Sweden.  
According to ESSPROS (2012) social protection 
expenditure according to the disability function covers 
benefits that provide an income to persons below 
standard retirement age as established in the reference 
scheme whose ability to work and earn is impaired 
beyond a minimum level laid down by legislation by a 
physical or mental disability; provide rehabilitation 
services specifically required by disabilities and 
provide goods and services other than medical care to 
  
1
1
cov .
n
xy i ii
x x y y xy x y
n 
     
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disabled people. Benefits in the disability function 
represent cash benefits (i.e. disability pension, early 
retirement benefit due to a reduced capacity to work, 
care allowance, economic integration of the 
handicapped and other cash benefits) and benefits in 
kind, such as accommodation, assistance in carrying 
out daily tasks, rehabilitation and other benefits in kind.  
European countries vary in their per cent rate of 
social protection expenditure on disability. In the years 
2005–2012, the highest expenditure on social 
protection through the disability function (as % of 
GDP) was reached in Scandinavian countries of 
Denmark and Sweden, and also in Switzerland, as 
opposed to Latvia, Romania and Greece. For the range 
of social protection expenditure by the disability 
function as % of GDP, see Table 2. The pension system, 
as one of the main parts of social protection, constitutes 
a system which concentrates the biggest economic 
potential regardless of the system of financing (pay-as-
you go, or capitalisation). Pension systems determine 
the standard of living of a significant part of the 
population, and consequently its consumption, and 
have an impact on economy. They are influenced by 
economic stability or instability of a country, but also 
by other factors, such as employment or population  
 
Table 1 Expenditure on social protection by function–sickness/health care (% of GDP) 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Belgium 7.4 7.1 7.2 7.6 8.3 8.2 8.3 8.5 
Czech Republic 6.3 6.0 5.9 5.8 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.4 
Denmark 6.1 6.1 6.3 6.5 7.3 7.0 6.9 6.9 
Estonia 4.0 3.7 4.0 4.8 5.3 4.8 4.4 4.3 
Greece 6.7 6.9 6.8 7.4 8.0 8.2 7.5 6.4 
France 8.8 8.7 8.6 8.6 9.2 9.3 9.2 9.2 
Italy 6.7 6.8 6.6 6.9 7.3 7.3 7.0 7.0 
Latvia 3.4 3.8 3.4 3.7 3.9 3.7 3.2 3.0 
Luxembourg 5.5 5.1 4.9 5.3 6.1 5.8 5.6 5.8 
Hungary 6.5 6.4 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.6 5.1 
Netherlands 8.0 8.8 8.6 9.4 10.4 10.7 10.9 11.3 
Poland 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.5 4.7 4.5 4.3 4.2 
Romania 3.8 3.3 3.5 3.5 4.2 4.4 4.1 4.1 
Slovakia 4.8 4.8 4.7 5.1 5.8 5.5 5.4 5.5 
Sweden 7.9 7.8 7.5 7.5 7.9 7.4 7.5 7.6 
United Kingdom 7.8 7.9 7.7 7.8 8.7 8.4 9.0 9.3 
Switzerland 6.8 6.5 6.4 6.4 7.1 6.7 6.8 7.2 
Source: Eurostat (2015b) 
Table 2 Expenditure on social protection by function–disability (% of GDP) 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Belgium 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 
Czech Republic 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 
Denmark 4.2 4.2 3.8 3.7 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.1 
Estonia 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 
Greece 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 
France 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 
Italy 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.7 
Latvia 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 
Luxembourg 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 
Hungary 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6 
Netherlands 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.3 
Poland 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 
Romania 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.3 
Slovakia 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Sweden 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.6. 4.1 3.9 3.9 
United Kingdom 2.3 2.4 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 
Switzerland 3.1 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5 
Source: Eurostat (2015b)
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development. Their financing is part of public finances, 
which influences their quality and sustainability 
(Mikušová Meričková and Halásková 2014a; Pestieau, 
2006; Saraceno, 2008).  
Basic regimes of social policies (socio-democratic, 
conservative, liberal model) in the respective countries 
show a different rate of social protection expenditure 
on old age expressed as % of GDP (Table 3). Social 
protection expenditure by the old age function 
according to ESSPROS (2012) covers benefits that 
provide a replacement income when the aged person 
retires from the labour market; guarantee a certain 
income when a person has reached a prescribed age 
and provide goods or services specifically required by 
the personal or social circumstances of the elderly. A 
part of social protection expenditure provided by the 
old-age function are cash benefits, which include old-
age pension, anticipated old-age pension, partial 
pension, care allowance, other cash benefits, and 
benefits in kind: accommodation, assistance in carrying 
out daily tasks and other benefits in kind. The European 
population is the oldest in the world, which results in 
an increase in social protection expenditure by old age, 
where the main part is the old-age pension.  
In years 2005–2015, the highest rate of expenditure 
on social protection by old-age function (as % of GDP) 
in the set of selected countries was observed in Greece, 
Italy (countries with the south-European model), 
Denmark and Sweden, (countries with the social-
democratic model), and France (continental model). In 
the last years of this period, a relatively high rate of 
expenditure on social protection according to old-age 
function (as % of GDP) was observed also in the United 
Kingdom (Table 3). Conversely, among the countries 
with the lowest rate of expenditure on social protection 
by old-age function (as % of GDP) in the years 2005–
2012 were found in Estonia, Latvia and Romania, 
which are countries with the lowest total expenditure 
on social protection. 
The character and amount of public expenditure 
also markedly influences the range of public social 
expenditure, depending on the share of public sector, 
tax burden and redistribution (Adema et al., 2011; 
Goudswaard and Caminada, 2010; Halásková and 
Halásek, 2015; Ivančík, 2012; Mikušová Meričková 
and Halásková, 2014a; van Kersbergen and Hemerijck, 
2012; Wang et al., 2012). The amount of social 
protection expenditure (on sickness/health care, 
disability and old age) in the selected European 
countries provides a basic outline of the tendencies of 
this expenditure, which differ according to concepts 
adopted in areas of social protection, the health-care 
system and the pension system. The range of such 
expenditures in the individual countries is influenced 
by the economic situation, fiscal rules and demographic 
development. 
4.2 Level of socio-economic development and 
income inequality in the selected European 
countries 
The level of socio-economic development is quantified 
by means of the Human Development Index (HDI), 
which is the most known indicator of the long-term 
social and economic development of individual 
countries. Numerous authors–Costantini and Monni 
(2008), Diniz and Sequeira (2012), Mankiw (2010), 
and Ranis (2004) –consider the Human Development 
Index (HDI) a more complex indicator of socio-
economic development than income per capita or GDP.  
 
Table 3 Expenditure on social protection by function–old-age (% of GDP) 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Belgium 8.4 8.4 8.2 8.7 9.5 9.2 9.5 9.6 
Czech Republic 6.8 6.8 6.9 7.3 8.3 8.5 8.9 9.3 
Denmark 11.0 10.8 12.6 12.7 14.0 13.8 14.2 14.4 
Estonia 5.3 5.3 5.1 6.2 7.9 7.8 6.9 6.7 
Greece 11.5 10.4 10.5 10.8 11.3 11.9 12.7 15.4 
France 11.1 11.1 11.2 11.5 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.9 
Italy 12.8 13.0 13.1 13.6 14.5 14.8 14.9 15.3 
Latvia 5.7 5.5 4.8 5.4 7.6 9.1 7.9 7.5 
Luxembourg 5.6 5.4 5.2 5.6 6.5 6.2 6.3 6.7 
Hungary 7.8 8.0 8.4 8.8 9.1 9.1 9.3 9.9 
Netherlands 9.7 9.5 9.6 9.7 10.4 10.7 10.8 11.3 
Poland 9.3 9.4 8.8 9.0 9.9 9.3 9.0 8.7 
Romania 5.3 5.2 5.5 6.5 6.5 8.1 7.9 7.6 
Slovakia 6.2 6.1 5.9 5.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 7.0 
Sweden 11.5 11.1 11.1 11.4 12.6 12.2 11.9 12.4 
United Kingdom 10.6 10.4 10.5 10.9 12.2 12.1 12.2 12.7 
Switzerland 10.0 9.8 9.7 9.6 10.3 10.3 10.4 10.7 
Source: Eurostat (2015b)  
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This index combines information on economic growth 
(GDP per capita in the latest methodology of 
calculation of national income per capita), level of 
education (literacy in the adult population), state of 
health (life expectancy). The indicator of economic 
development is supplemented with indicators of social 
development, reflecting on the level of education and 
provision of health care (Mikušová Meričková and 
Halásková, 2014b).  
The HDI reaches values in an interval of 0 to 1. The 
most advanced countries approach the value of 1. HDI 
classifications according to the Human Development 
Report (2014) are based on HDI fixed cut-off points, 
which are derived from the quartiles of distributions of 
component indicators. The cut-off points are HDI of 
less than 0.550 for low human development, 0.550–
0.699 for medium human development, 0.700–0.799 
for high human development, and 0.800 or greater for 
very high human development 
The majority of selected countries (Table 4) reached 
an HDI level of very high human development, despite 
marked differences between them. European countries 
with the highest human development level–
Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Denmark–reached 
an HDI level above 0.900, while countries such as 
Latvia reached an HDI of 0.786–0.808, and Hungary, 
reached an HDI level just slightly above 0.800. From 
the selected set of European countries, the lowest HDI 
was observed in Romania, HDI 0.750–0.782, which is 
a level of high human development. Regarding the level 
of economic advancement and HDI, marked 
differences are observed mainly in the comparison of 
European countries with the least developed 
economies, where HDI reaches a level of medium or 
low human development (Majerová, 2014).  
According to the Human Development Report 
(2014), three standard ways of measuring income 
inequality are used: the ratio of the top and the bottom 
quintiles, the Palma ratio, which is the ratio of income 
of the top 10 per cent and the bottom 40 per cent, and 
the Gini coefficient. Income inequality for the selected 
sample of countries is expressed on the basis of the Gini 
coefficient, where the 0 value represents equal incomes 
for everyone, whilst 100 represents a full-scale income 
inequality. In connection with a specific character of 
social policy and redistribution processes, tendencies to 
reduce income inequalities appear in numerous 
European countries, most notably in Poland, the UK 
and Switzerland. By contrast, in some countries, such 
as Denmark, France or Romania, income inequality 
increased over the period 2005–2012. 
Notable differences in income inequality values are 
evident in the set of the selected countries (Table 5). In 
the course of the observed years, Latvia and Greece 
belonged to the countries with the highest income 
inequality, with the Gini coefficient reaching above 34 
in 2012. Marked income inequalities were also 
observed in Romania, Great Britain, Estonia, Italy or 
Poland, with the Gini coefficient above the EU28 
average (30.4). By contrast, among countries with the 
lowest income inequality (the Gini coefficient ranged 
from 24.0 to 25.5) are found the Netherlands, Slovakia, 
the Czech Republic and Sweden. Specifically in the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, the Gini coefficient was 
decreasing, which results in balanced salaries. 
Numerous papers tackle income inequality in 
relation to economic growth, when the extent of income  
 
Table 4 Level of socio-economic development quantified by the Human Development Index 
Country 2005 2008 2010 2012 
Belgium 0.865 0.873 0.877 0.880 
Czech Republic 0.845 0.856 0.858 0.861 
Denmark 0.891 0.896 0.898 0.900 
Estonia 0.821 0.832 0.830 0.839 
Greece 0.853 0.858 0.856 0.854 
France 0.867 0.875 0.879 0.884 
Italy 0.858 0.868 0.869 0.872 
Latvia 0.786 0.813 0.809 0.808 
Luxembourg 0.876 0.882 0.869 0.880 
Hungary 0.805 0.814 0.817 0.817 
Netherlands 0.888 0.901 0.904 0.915 
Poland 0.803 0.817 0.826 0.833 
Romania 0.750 0.781 0.779 0.782 
Slovakia 0.803 0.824 0.826 0.829 
Sweden 0.887 0.891 0.895 0.897 
United Kingdom 0.888 0.890 0.895 0.890 
Switzerland 0.901 0.903 0.915 0.916 
Source: Human Development Report (2014) 
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inequality is also influenced by the phase of the 
economic cycle (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Cingano, 
2014; Perotti, 1996; Pisu 2012) or when the attention is 
paid to income distribution, inequality and poverty on 
a practical level (Förster, 2000; Korpi and Palme, 1998) 
4.3 Correlation between expenditure on social 
protection by function and socio-economic 
development in the selected European 
countries 
The present analysis focuses on whether there exists 
any linear relation between social protection 
expenditure (according to the selected functions: 
sickness/health care, disability, old-age) and the level 
of socio-economic development (quantified by the 
HDI), and whether there exists a mutual influence 
between these indicators. Correlation is observed by 
means of the Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r) and 
the coefficient of determination (r2). Results of the 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient and the coefficient of 
determination for the set of selected countries in the 
years 2005–2012 are presented in Table 6.  
Based on the Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r), a 
direct linear correlation was observed in most countries 
between social protection expenditure on 
sickness/health care and the HDI, of which a strong, 
statistically significant correlation (p < 0.05) was found 
in the Netherlands in 2005–2012, with the Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient r = 0.955, and the coefficient of 
determination r2 = 0.912, i.e. 91.2%; in Denmark, with 
r = 0.946 and r2 = 0.895, i.e. 89.5%; in Belgium, with r 
= 0.939 and r2 = 0.882, i.e. 88.2%; and Slovakia, with 
r = 0.904 and r2 = 0.817, i.e. 81.7%. What applies as a 
result is that the higher the social protection 
expenditure on sickness/health care is, the higher the 
HDI is in these countries. As the coefficient of 
determination shows, social protection expenditure on 
sickness/health care and the HDI in the Netherlands 
were 91.2% mutually influenced and 8.8% influenced 
by other factors; in Denmark, these factors were 89.5% 
mutually influenced and were 10.5% influenced by 
other factors; in Belgium, mutually, 88.2% and by other 
factors, 11.8%; and in Slovakia, mutually 81.7% and by 
other factors, 18.3%. 
Based on the Pearson’s correlation coefficient, 
social protection expenditure on disability and the 
Human Development Index proved anticorrelation in 8 
countries, for which there was a strong, statistically 
significant anticorrelation (p < 0.05) in Poland, with r 
= –0.933 and r2 = 0.870, i.e. 87%; and in Luxembourg, 
with r = –0.905 and r2 = 0.820, i.e. 82%. In Sweden, a 
statistically significant anticorrelation was proved in 
social protection expenditure on disability and the 
Human Development Index (p < 0.01), with r = –0.983 
and r2 = 0.966, i.e. 96.6%. It therefore applies that the 
higher the social protection expenditure on disability is, 
the higher the HDI. The coefficient of determination 
showed that social protection expenditure on disability 
and the HDI were 87% mutually influenced in Poland, 
82% in Luxembourg, and 96.6% in Sweden. 
Conversely, based on the Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient anticorrelation was observed in 9 countries 
from the set between social protection expenditure on 
disability and HDI (see Table 6). A statistically 
significant correlation (p < 0.05) was proved in France, 
with r = 0.891 and r2 = 0.794. Thus, the higher social 
protection expenditure on disability is, the higher the 
HDI. The determination coefficient proved that social  
Table 5 Income inequality evaluated using to the Gini coefficient 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Belgium 28.0 27.8 26.3 27.5 26.4 26.6 26.3 26.5 
Czech Republic 26.0 25.3 25.3 24.7 25.1 24.9 25.2 24.9 
Denmark 23.9 23.7 25.2 25.1 26.9 26.9 27.8 28.1 
Estonia 34.1 33.1 33.4 30.9 31.4 31.3 31.9 32.5 
Greece 33.2 34.3 34.3 33.4 33.1 32.9 33.5 34.3 
France 27.7 27.3 26.6 29.8  29.9 29.8 30.8 30.5 
Italy 32.8 32.1 32.2 31.0 31.5 31.2 31.9 31.9 
Latvia 36.2 38.9 35.4 37.5 37.5 35.9 35.1 35.7 
Luxembourg 26.5 27.8 27.4 27.7 29.2 27.9 27.2 28.0 
Hungary 27.6 33.3 25.6 25.2 24.7 24.1 26.8 26.9 
Netherlands 26.9 26.4 27.6 27.6 27.2 25.5 25.8 25.4 
Poland 35.6 33.3 32.2 32.0 31.4 31.1 31.1 30.9 
Romania 31.0 33.0 37.8 36.0 34.9 33.3 33.2 33.2 
Slovakia 26.2 28.1 24.5 23.7 24.8 25.9 25.7 25.3 
Sweden 23.4 24.0 23.4 24.0 24.8 24.1 24.4 24.8 
United Kingdom 34.6 32.5 32.6 33.9 32.4 32.9 33.0 31.3 
Switzerland – – 30.4 31.1 30.7 29.6 29.7 28.8 
Source: Eurostat (2015a) 
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protection expenditure on disability and the HDI were 
79.4% mutually influenced and 20.6% accounted for 
other factors. 
In 10 of the evaluated European countries, based on 
the Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r), a strong 
correlation was proved between social protection 
expenditure on old age and the HDI. A strong 
statistically significant correlation (p < 0.01) was 
proved in Denmark, France, and Belgium, and a strong 
statistically significant correlation (p < 0.05) in 
Hungary, Italy and the Czech Republic. It therefore 
applies that the larger the amount of social protection 
expenditure on old age is, the higher the HDI. As can 
be derived from the coefficient of determination (r2), 
social protection expenditure on old age and the HDI in 
Denmark were 99% mutually influenced and 1% 
influenced by other factors, in Belgium, 92.5% 
mutually and 6.5% by other factors, in France 92.2% 
mutually and 7.8% by other factors.  
Expenditure on social protection by selected 
functions (on old age, on the family and on 
unemployment) in relation to HDI has been evaluated 
in previous research (Mikušová Meričková and 
Halásková, 2014a, 2014b). The results confirmed a 
strong direct linear correlation in the majority of the 
evaluated OECD countries between the amount of 
social protection expenditure on old age and the HDI 
using the Pearson’s correlation coefficient, similar to 
the present research. 
Since the HDI is a complex index, its result of the 
correlation is methodologically limited regarding the 
observed social protection expenditure by functions 
(Mikušová Meričková and Halásková, 2014a, 2014b). 
Index distribution and testing correlations of its parts of 
social protection expenditure can be, according to the 
authors, a theme for further validation of the present 
results. 
4.4 Correlation between expenditure on social 
protection by function and income inequality 
in the selected European countries  
Also, based on the Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r) 
and the coefficient of determination (r2), an evaluation 
is provided regarding whether there exists a correlation 
between the amount of expenditure on social protection 
(based on selected functions: sickness/health care, 
disability, old age) and income inequality (expressed by 
the Gini coefficient). Results of the Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient (r) and the coefficient of 
determination (r2) for the set of selected countries in the 
years 2005–2012 are provided in Table 7. 
On the basis of the Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
(r), a positive linear correlation between social 
protection expenditure on sickness/health care and the 
Gini coefficient was proved in seven countries from the  
 
Table 6 Relation between expenditure on social protection by selected functions and the HDI in the years 2005–2012 
 
 
Social protection expenditure 
on sickness/health care and 
index HDI 
Social protection expenditure 
on disability and index HDI 
Social protection expenditure 
on old age and index HDI 
Pearson’s 
correlation 
coefficient 
(r) 
Coefficient of 
determination 
(r2) 
Pearson’s 
correlation 
coefficient 
(r) 
Coefficient of 
determination 
(r2) 
Pearson’s 
correlation 
coefficient 
(r) 
Coefficient of 
determination 
(r2) 
Belgium 0.939* 0.882 0.730 0.533 0.962** 0.925 
Czech Republic 0.092 0.008 0.456 0.208 0.888* 0.789 
Denmark 0.946* 0.895 –0.047 0.002 0.995** 0.990 
Estonia 0.320 0.102 0.767 0.588 0.543 0.295 
Greece 0.546 0.298 –0.299 0.089 –0.477 0.228 
France 0.705 0.497 0.891* 0.794 0.960** 0.922 
Italy 0.656 0.430 0.788 0.621 0.911* 0.830 
Latvia 0.200 0.040 0.370 0.137 0.328 0.108 
Luxembourg 0.000 0.000 –0.905* 0.820 0.291 0.085 
Hungary –0.861 0.741 –0.696 0.484 0.915* 0.837 
Netherlands 0.955* 0.912 –0.743 0.552 0.864 0.746 
Poland 0.585 0.342 –0.933* 0.870 –0.636 0.404 
Romania 0.262 0.069 0.773 0.598 0.835 0.697 
Slovakia 0.904* 0.817 0.862 0.743 0.491 0.241 
Sweden –0.715 0.511 –0.983** 0.966 0.839 0.704 
United Kingdom 0.220 0.048 –0.217 0.047 0.503 0.253 
Switzerland 0.568 0.323 –0.745 0.555 0.856 0.738 
       
Note: * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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set. With respect to this, a strong, statistically 
significant correlation in the years 2005–2012 was 
confirmed in Denmark, with r = 0.875 (p < 0.01); 
France, with r = 0.742; and Latvia, with r = 0.750 (p < 
0.05). It therefore applies that the higher the range of 
social protection expenditure on sickness/health care is, 
the higher the income inequality, expressed by the Gini 
coefficient, is. The coefficient of determination (r2) 
showed that social protection expenditure on 
sickness/health care and the Gini coefficient were, in 
Denmark, 76.6% mutually influenced and 23.4% 
influenced by other factors; in France 55% mutually 
influenced and by other factors, 45%; and in Latvia 
56.3% influenced mutually and 43.7% by other factors. 
Conversely, negative linear correlation was observed 
between the range of social protection expenditure on 
sickness/health care and the Gini coefficient in 10 
countries. A statistically significant anticorrelation was 
proved in Estonia, with r = –0.836 (p < 0.01), and 
Greece, with r = –0.766 (p < 0.01). It applies that the 
higher the range of social protection expenditure on 
sickness/health care is, the lower the income inequality 
expressed by the Gini coefficient (see Table 7). 
On the basis of the Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
correlation between the range of social protection 
expenditure on disability and the Gini coefficient was 
proved in 9 countries. A strong, statistically significant 
correlation was proved in France, with r = 0.877 (p < 
0.01), and Poland, with r = 0.969 (p < 0.05). It applies 
that the higher the range of social protection 
expenditure on disability is, the higher the income 
inequality, expressed by the Gini coefficient, in these 
countries is. By contrast, anticorrelation of the amount 
of social protection expenditure on disability and the 
Gini coefficient was proved in 8 countries from the set. 
A strong, statistically significant anticorrelation was 
proved in Estonia, with r = –0.746 (p < 0.05). Thus, the 
higher the range of social protection expenditure on 
disability is, the lower income inequality, expressed by 
the Gini coefficient, is. As the coefficient of 
determination (r2) showed, social protection 
expenditure on disability and the value of the Gini 
coefficient were 93.9% influenced mutually in Poland 
and 6.1% by other factors, in Estonia 55.6% mutually 
and 44.4% by other factors, in France, 50.8% mutually 
and 49.2% by other factors. 
From the set of selected countries in the period 
2005–2012, based on the Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient, a strong, statistically significant correlation 
was proved between social protection expenditure on 
old age and the Gini coefficient (p < 0.01) in Denmark 
(r = 0.976), France (r = 0.877) and Sweden (r = 0.819; 
p < 0.05). It therefore applies that the higher the social-
protection expenditure on old age is, the higher the 
income inequality, expressed by the Gini coefficient, in 
these countries is. This relates to the set manner of 
financing social protection in the Scandinavian  
 
Table 7 Relation between expenditure on social protection by selected functions and the Gini coefficient in 2005–2012 
 
 
Social protection expenditure 
on sickness/health care and 
Gini coefficient 
Social protection expenditure 
on disability and Gini 
coefficient 
Social protection expenditure 
on old age and Gini coefficient 
Pearson’s 
correlation 
coefficient 
(r) 
Coefficient of 
determination 
(r2) 
Pearson’s 
correlation 
coefficient 
(r) 
Coefficient of 
determination 
(r2) 
Pearson’s 
correlation 
coefficient 
(r) 
Coefficient of 
determination 
(r2) 
Belgium –0.635 0.403 –0.423 0.179 –0.602 0.362 
Czech Republic 0.175 0.030 –0.135 0.018 –0.511 0.261 
Denmark 0.875** 0.766 0.100 0.010 0.976** 0.953 
Estonia –.836** 0.699 –0.746* 0.556 –0.777* 0.604 
Greece  –0.766* 0.587 –0.394 0.155 0.154 0.024 
France 0.742* 0.550 0.713* 0.508 0.877** 0.769 
Italy –0.673 0.453 –0.665 0.442 –0.487 0.237 
Latvia 0.750* 0.563 –0.207 0.043 –0.331 0.110 
Luxembourg 0.530 0.281 0.003 0.000 0.505 0.255 
Hungary 0.517 0.267 0.252 0.064 –0.482 0.232 
Netherlands –0.678 0.459 0.245 0.060 –0.776* 0.602 
Poland –0.699 0.489 0.969** 0.939 0.188 0.035 
Romania –0.309 0.095 0.298 0.089 –0.041 0.002 
Slovakia –0.255 0.065 –0.176 0.031 0.113 0.013 
Sweden 0.035 0.001 –0.449 0.202 0.819* 0.671 
United Kingdom –0.635 0.403 0.388 0.150 –0.549 0.301 
Switzerland –0.576 0.332 0.600 0.360 –0.824* 0.679 
Note: **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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countries (mostly from general taxes). Every citizen has 
the right to a certain range of pension, and fully 
employed persons qualify for supplementary benefits. 
Based on the Pearson’s correlation coefficient, a 
statistically significant anticorrelation was proved in 
Switzerland, the Netherlands and in Estonia, where the 
higher the amount of social protection expenditure on 
old age, the lower the income inequality, expressed by 
means of the Gini coefficient, is. The coefficient of 
determination (r2) showed that social protection 
expenditure on old age and the value of the Gini 
coefficient were 95.3% mutually influenced in 
Denmark and 4.7% by other factors, in France there 
was 87.7% mutual influence and 12.3% from other 
factors. 
 The relation between social expenditure and 
income inequality was also dealt with by other authors 
(Afonzo et al., 2008; Ferrarini and Nelson, 2003; 
Immervoll and Richardson, 2011; Niehues, 2010; 
Pestieau, 2006). The negative impact of social 
expenditure on income inequality, evaluated using the 
Gini coefficient, and the use of correlation and 
regression analysis, was confirmed in 15 OECD 
countries (Pestieau, 2006), or by research carried out on 
a set of 22 OECD countries (Afonzo et al., 2008). 
Ferrarini and Nelson (2003) show that only a 
limited number of studies have attempted to identify the 
link between specific social transfer programmes and 
income inequality in a comparative setting. Taking a 
closer look at the relation of social expenditure (on the 
sickness/ health care, on disability and on old age) 
according to different functions in connection to 
income inequality, a negative relation of social 
expenditure and income inequality was confirmed in 
most countries. Results of 15 EU countries, seen in 
Niehues (2010), showed that social expenditure on old 
age had a statistically significant negative impact on 
income inequality, as opposed to the relation between 
social expenditure on health and social expenditure on 
disability and income inequality, where a moderate 
positive correlation was observed. 
Analyses of social expenditure of public and private 
character provide a different angle. According to 
Goudswaard and Caminada (2010), public social 
transfers are effectively targeted at low-income groups. 
Private social expenditures proved a negative and 
statistically significant relation to income 
redistribution. Countries with high private social 
expenditure thus have a low income redistribution. As 
regards total social expenditure, a positive and 
significant link to income redistribution can be 
observed, although the relation is more moderate 
compared to public social expenditure. 
These finding show that not only various functions 
of social expenditure but also types of social 
expenditure (total, public, private) have a different 
impact on income inequality. A more detailed analysis 
of mutual relations, social expenditure by various 
functions and income-inequality indicators as well as 
socio-economic development may be used as themes 
for further research using regression analysis. 
5. Conclusion 
The issue of income inequality consists of a discussion 
about the extent and forms of redistribution. Tackling 
this issue has wide economic and political dimensions 
which are reflected in a compromise between 
effectiveness and equality (trade-off). The general 
theoretical view on the solution to this issue, presented 
by the neoclassical school of welfare economics, 
encounters numerous methodological problems 
(definition of the function of social welfare, 
interpersonal comparison of individual well-being) that 
hamper the attempts to find a proper response.  
At the practical level, this compromise constitutes 
not only an implementation of social-policy 
instruments, but also of the achieved results of 
economic policy, with the aim of defining an optimal 
range and character of redistribution processes and 
mitigating income inequalities while keeping social 
rest. That is achievable by defining those areas of social 
protection where public expenditures make a positive 
influence on the quality of life in a society. 
The empirical study reacts to this issue, providing a 
solution to the research question of the relation between 
the extent of selected types of social protection 
expenditures and the achieved level of socio-economic 
development. The existence of a relation between the 
selected amount of expenditure of social protection 
according to function (expenditure on sickness/health 
care, on the disabled and on elderly people) on the one 
hand, and the achieved level of socio-economic 
development and quantified Human Development 
Index (HDI) and the level of division of available 
incomes, evaluated using the Gini coefficient, on the 
other, was statistically tested on a sample of 17 
European countries.  
The results showed that in most European countries 
in question, expenditure on social protection (on 
sickness/health care and on old age) had a positive 
impact on the level of socio-economic development, 
evaluated by the Human Development Index. Social 
protection expenditure on disability, however, had a 
rather negative impact on the socio-economic 
development of the countries in question. Conversely, 
social protection expenditure on sickness/health care, 
disability and old age had a mostly negative impact on 
income inequality, evaluated through the Gini 
coefficient, in most countries. With the exception of 
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Denmark, Sweden (socio-democratic model of social 
policy) and France (conservative model of social 
policy), it was confirmed in most countries that the 
evaluated categories of social protection expenditure 
mitigate income inequality.  
A high level of heterogeneity of selected countries 
with respect to the observed aspects proves a markedly 
different extent and nature of redistribution processes. 
The findings of the research should therefore be 
analysed more deeply through the redistribution theory 
of defined compromise trade-off between efficiency 
and equity. The compromise in each country depends 
on the character of the subparts and the models of social 
policy. From our perspective, these are systems of 
social security in case of illness, which are connected 
with financial and material benefits, models of health-
care systems (Bismarck model, liberal model and the 
model of national health service), and concepts of the 
pension policy (presented by the liberal, socio-
democratic and conservative model of social policy). 
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